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Is a Postmarital Agreement in Your Best Interest?
Why Louisiana Civil Code Article 2329 Should Let
You Decide
INTRODUCTION
The institution of marriage is changing. Over the last few
decades, the United States has witnessed a persistent decrease in
the number of individuals who choose to get married.1 In fact, the
marriage rate has been in “steady decline since the 1970s,” and
researchers currently report that the marriage rate has dropped to
an all-time low.2 The public opinion of marriage has likewise taken
a significant downturn.3 Studies show that Americans from all
social and educational circles hold a generally unfavorable view of
marriage as an institution.4 Overall, there seems to be a growing
sentiment across the country that marriage is a hassle and is simply
unnecessary.5
Multiple factors are likely responsible for the evolution of
marriage into a perceived voluntary, unnecessary institution in the
eyes of modern day society.6 For example, alternative living
arrangements are more socially acceptable today than they were in
the past.7 Now more than ever, individuals feel comfortable living
with a partner before marriage or even living as a single parent.8
Therefore, couples may feel as if they have more habitational
Copyright 2015, by CHRISTOPHER K. ULFERS.
1. Megan Gannon, US Marriage Rate Drops to New Low, LIVESCIENCE
(July 19, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.livescience.com/38308-us-marriage-ratenew-low.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H2BH-WNHX.
2. Id.
3. Stephanie Pappas, Record Number of Americans Are Unmarried,
LIVESCIENCE (Dec. 14, 2011, 8:11 AM), http://www.livescience.com/17462-re
cord-number-americans-unmarried.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NS5S4MDU.
4. Id.
5. See Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for
Premarital and Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 317 (2012) [hereinafter
Bix et al.].
6. Some scholars suggest that several factors are responsible for the demise
of marriage, “including a delay in marriage because of economic concerns and
educational pursuits, greater social acceptance of cohabitation and parenthood
outside of marriage, and arguably a growing sense that marriage is unnecessary.”
Id. See also Stephanie Hallett, Marriage Rate in America Drops Drastically,
HUFFPOST WEDDINGS (Dec. 14, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2011/12/14/marriage-rates-in-america_n_1147290.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/6TD4-ZE44.
7. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317.
8. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317.
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options than were available in the past, causing beliefs that
marriage is required before cohabitation to essentially fall by the
wayside. Another factor is that some individuals postpone
marriage until they complete their education and establish a
career.9 Understanding potential economic concerns, many
Americans believe that it is important to be financially stable
before entering into a matrimonial union.10 For example, couples
often choose to postpone marital vows until they are better able to
support families and afford the inevitable, inherent costs of
marriage.11
Furthermore, husbands and wives are much more equal to one
another in today’s world than they were in the past.12 For example,
the gender roles that once defined marriages have largely
disappeared.13 Wives are no longer expected to function as
homemakers, and it is now increasingly common to find dualincome households and wives with full-time jobs.14 However, the
law governing marital relationships has not exhibited a similar
equality-driven trend.15 Rather, the legal institution continues to
administer marriage with outdated policies and antiquated
perceptions, contributing to the general distaste for the institution
among prospective couples.16
In Louisiana, Civil Code article 2329 is a prime example of
marital law that has failed to adapt to the changing reality of
marriage.17 As the preeminent marital contracting law in Louisiana,
article 2329 governs the implementation and modification of marital
agreements both prior to and during marriage.18 However, article
9. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317.
10. See generally Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning
of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 17–19 (2012).
11. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317.
12. See Lucy A. Hawke, Gender Roles within American Marriage: Are
They Really Changing?, 5 ESSAI 70, 74 (2007), available at http://dc
.cod.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=essai, archived at http://per
ma.cc/6DTM-YL4X; Elizabeth R. Carter, Louisiana Prenuptial Agreements:
Issues for Contemporary Spouses, 42 ANN. EST. PLAN. SEMINAR 1, 5 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169991, archived
at https://perma.cc/456Z-LWWX?type=pdf; Bix et al., supra note 5, at 316.
13. See generally Hawke, supra note 12.
14. See id. at 73–74.
15. See generally Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007
WIS. L. REV. 827, 833 (2007).
16. See id. at 829–31; see generally Hawke, supra note 12.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
18. For the purposes of this Comment, marital agreements executed prior to
marriage are referred to as “premarital agreements,” and marital agreements
executed or modified during marriage are referred to as “postmarital agreements.”
If discussing the agreements in general, the author uses the term marital
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2329 proves to be rather complicated for spouses attempting to
execute or modify postmarital agreements during marriage.19
Before instituting or altering such an agreement, the parties must
petition a court and ask a judge to determine whether the parties
understand the proposed change and whether it is truly in their best
interests to make such a change.20 Therefore, the decision is
effectively taken out of the hands of the parties and given to a
judge, allowing an outsider to determine what is in the best
interests of the married couple.21 Consequently, spouses are unable
to easily and efficiently alter their marital agreement during
marriage, having to go to court to ask a judge for permission
instead. Although a judge may agree with the spouses that a
modification is in order, not every case is that simple. Married
couples in Louisiana are being forced to submit to the outside
judgment of third parties when contracting postmaritally, yet
today’s couples are more than capable of making the unique
determination as to what is in their best interests.
Moreover, article 2329 employs several exemptions to the
court-approval requirement, introducing inconsistency and
confusion into the marital agreement arena. For example, if
spouses were to modify their premarital agreement during their
marriage in an attempt to switch from a separate property regime
to the default community property regime, they would not be
required to fulfill the court-approval requirement.22 In addition, if
spouses had married outside of Louisiana and subsequently moved
into the state, they could implement a postmarital agreement within
one year of relocating without having to obtain court approval.23
These exemptions, along with a few others, illustrate the
inconsistent and arbitrary nature of article 2329’s court-approval
requirement, calling into question the article’s effectiveness as a
whole.

agreements. Some jurisdictions, however, refer to these agreements as prenuptial
agreements and postnuptial agreements, respectively. The terms prenuptial and
postnuptial are largely foreign to Louisiana matrimonial regime law, with the
Legislature and courts opting to refer to such agreements simply as marital
agreements. See id.
19. See generally id.
20. Id.
21. Despite article 2329’s use of an outsider’s decision-making in the
marital contracting process, marriage is generally intended to be a private
contractual matter between the involved parties. See Williams, supra note 15, at
833.
22. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
23. Id.
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Overall, the court-approval requirement of article 2329 is
outdated and unnecessary, signaling the need for a revision in
accordance with the modern aspects of marriage and the current
landscape of the marital institution. Due to the declining marriage
rate across the nation,24 the outdated and inconsistent legislative
justifications behind article 2329,25 and a general trend toward
freedom of contract,26 article 2329 should be improved to allow
flexibility and uniformity in the realm of marital contracting. In
fact, the Uniform Law Commission recently passed the Uniform
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, legislation designed to
update and provide equality in the laws governing premarital and
postmarital agreements.27 This piece of model legislation serves as
a useful example for the Louisiana Legislature to follow in
updating the state’s marital agreement law to allow spouses the
freedom to structure their marriages on their own terms. By
relaxing some of the more stringent requirements associated with
marriage, the institution should become more appealing to a wider
range of people. Although marital agreements likely require a
watchful eye and certain procedural safeguards, the current version
of article 2329 is not the answer.
Part I of this Comment offers a historical analysis of marriage,
marital contracting in general, and the evolution of marital
contracting laws in Louisiana, providing insight into the changing
nature of the institution and how such evolution will likely
continue. Next, Part II outlines the specific justifications for
revising article 2329, offering unique theories as to why the article
no longer makes sense in the modern landscape of marriage.
Shifting to a study of the differing approaches to the regulation of
marital agreements, Part III analyzes how marital contracting is
effectively governed in other United States jurisdictions. Lastly,
Part IV offers two alternative options that Louisiana could utilize
to revise article 2329 and effectively adapt its marital contracting
policies to the modern world. As this Comment illustrates, article
2329 is a relic of the past, inefficiently governing the everchanging world of marriage and subjecting its participants to
unnecessary burdens. The time is now to revise article 2329 and
position the marital institution for a thriving future.

24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (2012).
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I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: MARRIAGE THEORY
AND ARTICLE 2329
As the institution of marriage has evolved over time, marital
agreements have slowly become more important and widespread,
and the modern-day conceptions of marriage have also morphed
into a new phenomenon.28 Overall, marriage is a far cry from a
static institution, but the laws employed to govern marriage have
not evolved accordingly.29
A. Marriage Theory: A History of Marriage and Marital
Agreement Philosophy
Until the 18th century, marriages commonly functioned as
products of arrangement.30 Families and social units historically
coordinated and planned marriages for prospective couples, with
religious and social norms serving as the driving considerations.31
In essence, marriage formerly operated as a mechanism by which
families came together for “inheritance, property control, and other
economic or political reasons.”32
Love-based marriage is of “relatively recent vintage.”33 Ideally,
prospective couples now engage in lasting, meaningful courtships
prior to marriage in order to discern their true feelings.34 However,
28. Katherine Stoner, Prenuptial Agreements – An Overview, NOLO: LAW
ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/prenuptial-agreements-over
view-29569.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5BE-WAJ9 (last visited Feb. 5,
2015). Today, prospective couples no longer conceptualize marriage with the
traditional ideals that once characterized the institution. Id. Rather, marriage is
ultimately viewed as means to an end, rather than an end in itself. See id.
29. See generally Atwood, supra note 10, at 17.
30. Id. at 16–17 (citing STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM
OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 24–31 (2005)).
See also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998). Arranged
marriages were very common until the 18th century. Shamita Das Dasgupta,
Arranged Marriages, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY 40–42 (Jodi
O’Brien ed., 2008).
31. See Rasmusen et al., supra note 30, at 500–01; Atwood, supra note 10,
at 16–17.
32. Atwood, supra note 10, at 16−17.
33. Id. at 17. In other words, marriage has not always been a product of love
and affection. Id. In fact, in the overall scheme of marital history, love has only
been a driving force behind marriage for a relatively short period of time. Id.
34. See Ted L. Huston & Renate M. Houts, The Psychological Infrastructure
of Courtship and Marriage: The Role of Personality and Compatibility in
Romantic Relationships, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL COURSE OF MARRIAGE AND
DYSFUNCTION 114–120 (Thomas N. Bradbury ed., 1998). Although this may not
be true of all marital relationships, the overwhelming majority of lasting
FOR
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“[t]he very features that promised to make marriage such a unique
and treasured personal relationship opened the way for it to
become an optional and fragile one.”35 The introduction of
personal love and subjective affection into the foundations of
marriage has destabilized the institution; unfortunately, love often
does not last forever in the marriages of today.36 Also, “the
changing goals of marriage have contributed to its fragility, with
today’s couples viewing marriage as a vehicle for personal
fulfillment and self-realization rather than a commitment for lifelong sharing.”37 Over time, marriage has become increasingly
unstable, causing many to initially disfavor marital agreements as
mechanisms by which more powerful spouses were able to take
advantage of their comparably fragile counterparts.38 In fact, for
many years there was a widespread belief that marital agreements
encouraged divorce and manipulated weaker spouses to waive
financial and legal benefits.39
As marital agreements have become more common, however,
the law has gradually become friendlier towards them across the
country.40 For example, divorce rates in the United States
increased drastically around the turn of the 21st century,41
prompting couples to begin planning their futures carefully in an
attempt to avoid the financial difficulties implicated by the division
of marital property.42 Therefore, in the context of divorce, courts
across the country readily began to favor marital agreements as
fair, equitable mechanisms available to dissolve marriages.43
Today, in fact, premarital agreements are generally accepted

marriages involve some period of premarital courtship and personal decisionmaking. See id.
35. Atwood, supra note 10, at 17 (citing STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A
HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED
MARRIAGE 5 (2005)).
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Stoner, supra note 28.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See William F. Fraatz, Enforcing Antenuptial Contracts in Minnesota: A
Practice in Search of a Policy Basis in the Wake of McKee-Johnson v. Johnson,
77 MINN. L. REV. 441, 463–64 (1992).
42. See Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 (1997).
43. See id. at 898–99 (noting that courts no longer consider premarital
agreements to be void ab initio but rather are generally enforceable).
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throughout the United States.44 Many courts view such agreements
as “conducive to the welfare of the parties and the marriage
relationship as they tend to prevent strife, secure peace, and adjust,
settle, and generally dispose of rights in property.”45
Despite the favorable acceptance of marital agreements today,
policymakers, courts, and scholars continue to recognize a
potential for the abuse of such agreements.46 Such concerns are
founded upon “the intimate relationship of the parties to these
agreements, the underlying caring and nurturing union that is
presumably being contemplated, the fact that children may be
produced of the union, and the significant role the state has in
regulating this relationship and protecting the spouses and
children.”47
In other words, with the increasingly unpredictable and
emotional nature of marriage, scholars and policymakers recognize
the need to regulate marital agreements, in general, to avoid unjust
contracting and unfair impositions of will.48 Historically, such an
argument has been founded upon the notion that spouses are not on
a level playing field when it comes to marital bargaining power.49
Scholars argue that “the bargaining dynamics within an intact
marriage are materially different than the dynamics of premarital
bargaining,” triggering the need for heightened restrictions on
postmarital contracting between spouses.50 “These differences,
they claim, increase the potential for fraud and deception, often
leaving the spouse with less economic leverage (usually the wife)
with no choice but to sign an agreement presented by the wealthier
spouse (usually the husband).”51 However, the status of
“bargaining theory” in the realm of marital contracting is largely in
flux, with other scholars beginning to question the validity and
accuracy of heightened scrutiny arguments that are founded upon
the supposed unequal bargaining power within marriages.52

44. See Gary A. Debele & Susan C. Rhode, Prenuptial Agreements in the
United States, 1 IAML L.J. 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.iaml.org/
cms_media/files/prenuptial_agreements_in_the_us.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/W3R5-8TXS.
45. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 11:8, at 553–61 (4th ed. 2009) (footnotes omitted).
46. See, e.g., Debele & Rhode, supra note 44, at 2, 12.
47. Id. at 2.
48. See id.
49. Williams, supra note 15, at 829–30.
50. Id. at 830.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., id. at 851; see also infra Part II.B.
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B. Marital Agreements in Louisiana
In general, the State of Louisiana “enjoys a unique historical
acceptance of marriage contracts.”53 Marriage contracts have been
recognized and “widely accepted” in Louisiana since the 1700s, an
ode to the combined French and Spanish heritage upon which the
Louisiana legal system was founded.54 When Louisiana eventually
became an independent entity free from European control, it
continued to view premarital contracts favorably and specifically
endorsed such agreements in both the 1808 and the 1870 Civil
Codes.55 Marital contracts have been expressly approved and
accepted in Louisiana for nearly three centuries, “reflecting a
tenacious legal folkway that stood the test of time, persevered in
adversity, and prevailed over challenge.”56
1. Pre-Civil Code Article 2329
Enacted in 1979, Civil Code article 2329 currently serves as
the chief marital contracting law in Louisiana; however, the law
was not always detailed and explicit. Historically, Louisiana
allowed parties to enter into premarital agreements but not
postmarital agreements.57 For example, in January 1879, the
Louisiana Supreme Court offered a glimpse into the application of
pre-article 2329 marital contracting law in Hanley v. Drumm.58
The Court, faced with a dispute between a decedent’s widow and
the decedent’s estate, considered the validity and effectiveness of a
marital agreement executed prior to marriage.59 In approving the
marital agreement, the Court recognized that the parties were free to
stipulate as they pleased with respect to property rights, provided
that such stipulations were “not contrary to good morals.”60 In
addition, the Court addressed the potential modification of an
existing postmarital agreement, noting that “matrimonial agreements
may be altered by consent before, but not after, the marriage.”61
53. Carter, supra note 12, at 2.
54. Id. (citing Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish
Louisiana: A Study in “Notarial” Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1, 92 (1979)).
55. Id.
56. Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana:
A Study in “Notarial” Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1, 92 (1979).
57. See Hanley v. Drumm, 31 La. Ann. 106, 109 (1879).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 109–10 (“Prior to the marriage, the law treats the intended wife as
sui juris, as a free agent; but after it, it treats her as subject to the power and
authority of the husband, and as no longer able to protect herself. Hence it
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Therefore, as the Hanley Court recognized in the late 1870s,
parties were generally free to contract marital agreements prior to
marriage; however, parties were not able to modify such
agreements after their marriages became effective.62
The Hanley Court’s stance on the modification of marital
agreements serves as a vivid illustration of the historical view that
marriage was once an inherently one-sided relationship.63 Prior to
the enactment of article 2329, postmarital agreements were
prohibited altogether in Louisiana in an attempt to protect weaker
spouses and guard against spousal overreaching.64 In fact, Louisiana
has consistently attempted to protect the weaker spouse in
marriages, from its complete bar on postmarital agreements and
modifications in Hanley to the somewhat more lenient restrictions
of the current version of article 2329.65
2. The Policy and Application of Civil Code Article 2329
Over a century after the Hanley decision, the Louisiana
Legislature passed and enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2329—
legislation that appears to, at least somewhat, carry on the Hanley
tradition of protecting the weaker spouse. As did the prior law,
article 2329 distinguishes between premarital agreements, on the
one hand, and postmarital agreements, on the other.66 However,
article 2329 makes a noteworthy change to the law under Hanley
by allowing parties to enter into or modify marital agreements after
marriage, subject to some questionable restrictions.67
interposes to shield her from impositions and wrong.”). Therefore, the policies
offered by the Hanley court appear to be in line with the legislative goals cited
in support of article 2329. However, these policies and goals are outdated, no
longer warranting the distinctions employed in Hanley and codified in article
2329. See infra Part II.B.
62. See Hanley, 31 La. Ann. at 109.
63. See id. at 108–10. The law reflected an understanding that men were the
more powerful, dominant players in marital relationships. See id.
64. Id. at 109–10 (explaining that the wife is “no longer able to protect
herself” from “the power and authority of the husband” during marriage).
65. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
66. Compare Hanley, 31 La. Ann. at 109–10, with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329
(2015).
67. Id. Although parties are able to modify marital agreements after
marriage, the second paragraph of article 2329 imposes strict requirements on
such agreements. For example, article 2329 requires that such an agreement be
in the parties’ best interests. Id. Altering the Louisiana Supreme Court’s prior
determination that marital agreements could not be altered post-marriage
whatsoever, the Legislature made a concise determination to adapt the law to
changing times and allow for such modifications.
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At its core, Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 is an inconsistent
piece of legislation in the realm of marital contracting.68 Although
article 2329 allows spouses to contract postmaritally, it does not
treat premarital and postmarital agreements equally. Rather, article
2329 imposes heightened restrictions on marital agreements entered
into or modified during marriage, whereas marital agreements
entered into or modified prior to marriage are not burdened with
such restrictions.69 Specifically, under article 2329, a married couple
in Louisiana is allowed to enter into a marital agreement that alters
or modifies an existing matrimonial regime only after a “joint
petition and a finding by the court that [the agreement] serves their
best interests and that they understand the governing principles and
rules.”70 However, if executed prior to marriage, the only statutory
restrictions on marital agreements are that they must not
undermine public policy and must be executed in the appropriate
form.71 In addition, the Legislature codified, in article 2329, that
spouses are able to “subject themselves to the legal regime by a
matrimonial agreement at anytime without court approval.”72 Article
2329 also exempts new Louisiana domiciliaries from obtaining court
approval altogether if the postmarital agreement is executed within
the first year after relocating to the state.73
With specific policy concerns in mind, the Louisiana Legislature
enacted article 2329 in 1979 with the goal “of protecting the lessworldly spouse and preventing that spouse from entering into
68. See Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management
Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes
Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 91 (1979).
69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
70. Id.
71. Id. In general, contracts must be executed within the confines of public
policy. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2015). As a noteworthy Louisiana decision
explained, the chief public policy concern in the realm of marital contracting is
the notion that “a husband should support and assist his wife during the
existence of the marriage,” and any contracts providing otherwise will be
deemed null and void. Barber v. Barber, 38 So. 3d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). In effect, this aspect of article 2329
illustrates the Legislature’s preference for the legal regime of community
property in Louisiana. Spouses wishing to utilize a community property regime
do not need judicial approval, as the Legislature has presumably decided that the
legal regime of community property is naturally in the best interests of the
parties. See id.; Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91.
73. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). Although the purpose of this aspect of
article 2329 is not entirely clear, the Legislature appears to desire leniency with
couples unfamiliar to the laws of Louisiana, allowing them to act as if they are
starting anew in the marital agreement realm unbounded by the court-approval
requirement.
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disadvantageous agreements that were not fully understood.”74 Article
2329 functions as a compromise to the strict bar on postmarital
agreements under Hanley, adapting the policy justification of
protecting weaker spouses into a somewhat more lenient
framework.75 Specifically, through Act 709 of the 1979 session, the
Legislature purported to place “procedural limitations upon the
making or the modification of a matrimonial regime contract during
marriage and [add] limitations on the content of these agreements,
whether executed prior to or during marriage.”76 As such, the
Legislature defined specific distinctions between premarital and
postmarital contracting requirements in an attempt to satisfy its
concerns and protect women from their historically more powerful
male counterparts.77
The substantive suggestions and procedural limitations
embodied in article 2329 were recommended to the Legislature by
the Louisiana State Law Institute.78 Initially, the Law Institute’s
proposal did not include the court-approval requirement, drawing
the ire of some legal observers.79 For example, the Law Institute was
urged to reconsider its original proposal by Mr. Frank P.
Simoneaux, a concerned member of the Institute, who believed that
“modification of the legal community by a matrimonial agreement
[would] result in many nonworking spouses having little or no
ownership interest in assets or income that would form part of the
community under the legal regime.”80 Essentially, Mr. Simoneaux
argued that the Law Institute’s original proposal was deficient, as it
did not incorporate adequate procedural protections for disadvantaged
74. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, 54 LA. L. REV. 733, 741 (1994)
(discussing Boyer v. Boyer, 616 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1993)).
75. Compare Hanley v. Drumm, 31 La. Ann. 106 (1879), with LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2329 (2015).
76. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 90.
77. See supra Part I.B.2. Namely, the Legislature implemented distinctions
between premarital and postmarital contracting requirements by requiring
spouses to obtain judicial approval when attempting to alter marital agreements
after the marriage has taken effect. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91; LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
78. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 90.
79. Id. at 90−91.
80. Id. at 91 (citing Written Motion to Reconsider Previous Council Action
at 2, Submitted by Frank P. Simoneaux; seconded by A.N. Yiannopoulos and
Jack Caldwell (on file with author)). Furthermore, Mr. Simoneaux’s motion
“made clear that [his] concern in allowing spouses to enter into matrimonial
agreements was solely for the welfare of the spouse whose contributions to the
marriage were largely non-economic, and not for the interest of creditors or
forced heirs.” Id. Thus, Mr. Simoneaux’s concern was grounded upon the need
to protect against spousal overreaching. See id.
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spouses.81 Despite these concerns, the Law Institute “adhered to its
previous position, the original position of the Law Institute, that
contractual changes in a matrimonial regime during marriage
required no special procedural safeguard.”82
Thus, the original proposal of the Law Institute was submitted to
the Legislature without any requirement of court approval.83
However, Mr. Simoneaux’s plea was not forgotten. The courtapproval requirement for spouses entering into or modifying marital
agreements during marriage was added into the legislative bill at the
last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives, and this
version of the bill eventually became law after Senate amendment
and concurrence.84
Faced with the diverse goals and principles of article 2329, the
following subsections serve to illustrate specific jurisprudential
applications of article 2329 by Louisiana courts. In effect, these
decisions shed some light on how courts apply the complicated
provisions of article 2329, with most courts opting to closely
follow the article’s language and impose the heightened approval
requirements on parties contracting postmaritally.
a. A Basic Jurisprudential Application of Article 2329
As one of the preeminent judicial decisions involving marital
agreements in Louisiana, Boyer v. Boyer offers a noteworthy
illustration of the intricacies and distinctions embodied in article
2329 and how its requirements are applied in real-world
situations.85 In Boyer, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
was tasked with determining whether a marital agreement, entered
into by two spouses during marriage in an attempt to terminate the
legal regime of community property, was valid in accordance with
article 2329.86 The husband and wife in Boyer executed a “joint
petition for [the] establishment of a separate property regime” as
well as an affidavit stating that they read the agreement,
understood the rules involved, and believed that the agreement was
in their best interests.87
81. Id.
82. Id. This quote illustrates that the court-approval requirement of article
2329 was not an original aspect of the law from the Law Institute but a late
addition by the Legislature. Id. In fact, the Law Institute initially opted to treat
premarital and postmarital agreements identically. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Boyer v. Boyer, 616 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
86. Id. at 731.
87. Id. at 731.
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In considering this marital agreement, the court noted that the
Boyer agreement satisfied article 2329’s requirements, as the
spouses executed an effective document and a valid affidavit
purporting to understand and agree to the changes.88 However, in
Boyer, the spouses did not request a hearing in front of the court
regarding their new marital agreement.89 Nevertheless, the court
applied article 2329 and recognized that its plain language does not
require a physical hearing to take place.90 The Boyer court
explained that it found “no requirement in article 2329 for a
hearing before the court can grant approval. Certain statutory laws
in Louisiana do require a full hearing before a trial court can make
a decision, but article 2329 is not one of them.”91 Rather, “it is
within the discretion of the trial court to order a hearing and the
parties may ask for a hearing,” but one is not required.92
The Boyer decision provides a model benchmark for what is
and is not required to alter or implement a postmarital agreement.
The spouses are not required to actually appear before a court,
although such an option is certainly available.93 Rather, the
spouses must execute an agreement and convince the court that it
is in their best interests to modify or implement an effective
postmarital regime.94
Whereas the Boyer decision contemplates article 2329’s
application to the realm of postmarital agreements, the Louisiana
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Muller v. Muller considered its
application to premarital agreements.95 In Muller, the parties
executed a premarital agreement one day prior to their wedding;
however, a notary did not witness the parties actually sign the
document as required by law.96 At trial, the wife acknowledged
that the signature on the document was hers, thus bringing into
question whether such an acknowledgement could satisfy the form
requirements that were not fulfilled prior to marriage.97 Responding
88. Id. at 732–33.
89. Id. at 731.
90. Id. at 733.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 365. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
95. Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d 364, 368 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
96. Id. at 365–66. Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 requires that a
premarital agreement be “made by authentic act or by an act under private
signature duly acknowledged by the spouses.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2331 (2015).
In Muller, the wife claimed that the agreement was invalid as it was not
witnessed by anyone and should be set aside for lack of form. Muller, 72 So. 3d
at 365.
97. Muller, 72 So. 3d at 366.
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in the negative, the court ruled that postmarital acknowledgements of
premarital agreements are bound by the judicial approval dictates of
article 2329 and not the more lenient premarital standards:98
We hold that a post-nuptial acknowledgement cannot vitiate
the mandate of [Civil Code article 2329] that any matrimonial
agreement entered into during the marriage to modify or
terminate a matrimonial regime must be by joint petition, and
after a finding by the court that the agreement serves the best
interests of the parties.99
Thus, the Muller decision further emphasizes the sharp line
drawn between the contracting requirements of premarital
agreements and those of postmarital agreements. Despite the fact
that the parties intended to execute a premarital agreement, the
Muller court subjected a postmarital acknowledgment of that
agreement to the heightened restrictions applicable to postmarital
contracts under article 2329.100 The Muller court did not take
article 2329’s dictates lightly, opting instead to closely mirror its
language and apply its restrictions literally. Essentially, the court
decided that a postmarital recognition of a defective premarital
agreement rendered the entire agreement subject to the postmarital
restrictions embodied in article 2329.101 Such an application is
harsh for litigants, as they are required to follow article 2329’s
rigorous postmarital regulations even though they did not intend to
implement a postmarital agreement.
b. Article 2329’s Legal Regime Exemption
In Weinstein v. Weinstein, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal discussed a different aspect of article 2329, providing a
glimpse into one of the more controversial aspects of the article.102
Specifically at issue in Weinstein was the nature of a postmarital
agreement and whether the spouses wished to establish a community
property regime through that agreement.103 Although the court did
not reach a final decision as to the effectiveness of the agreement,104
98. Id. at 368.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 62 So. 3d 878, 883–84 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
103. Id. at 883–84.
104. In Weinstein, the Third Circuit considered a postmarital agreement and
the procedural history behind that agreement; however, the court did not rule as
to its effectiveness. Id. at 884. Rather, the court simply ruled on a dismissal
order that a judge had previously issued, finding that order was invalid. Id. at
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it did recognize that the spouses intended to implement a community
property regime through their postmarital agreement.105 In addition,
the court acknowledged that “the law does not require that an
agreement establishing a community property regime be authorized
by a judge, nor does it prohibit its being approved by or
acknowledged in front of a judge.”106
Therefore, the Weinstein agreement did not require court
approval in order to become effective and binding, an exemption
that seems puzzling to many Louisiana scholars as inconsistent
with the stated goals of article 2329.107 Scholars argue that spousal
overreaching is just as likely to occur when contracting the
community property regime as it is when attempting to implement
a separate marital property regime.108 In fact, the more powerful
spouse is just as able to take advantage of the weaker spouse
regardless of the type of regime being implemented.109
The legal regime exemption evidenced in Weinstein illustrates
how article 2329 presupposes that community property is in the best
interests of the spouses.110 However, it is easy to imagine a situation
in which community property may not be beneficial or in the best
interests of the spouses;111 Louisiana even seems to recognize such a
conclusion in the overall scheme of its matrimonial regime law by

884–85. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit did opine on the nature of the agreement
and the applicable aspects of article 2329 that were controlling. Id. at 883–84.
105. Id. at 884.
106. Id.
107. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91–92.
108. Regardless of whether or not the parties have married yet, the more
powerful party will have significantly more chips to bargain with when
considering a premarital or postmarital agreement. Id. The establishment of a
marital relationship does little to change the weakened position of a
downtrodden spouse. Id. If one spouse is inherently weaker for whatever reason,
that spouse will remain weaker after the marriage. See id.
109. See id.
110. See ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL
REGIMES § 8.6, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 848 (4th ed. 2013). In
other words, by not requiring spouses to obtain court approval when
implementing the legal regime of community property, the law seems to
recognize that the legal regime is naturally in the best interests of Louisiana’s
couples, rendering judicial insight and approval unnecessary. See id.
111. For example, in marriages involving substantial wealth and
wherewithal, community property may not be the best option for the spouses.
See Charlotte K. Goldberg, Opting In, Opting Out: Autonomy in the Community
Property States, 72 LA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2011). Rather, an agreement maintaining
the individual wealth of each party may better meet the needs of the spouses by
allowing them to retain control over their individual patrimony. Id.
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allowing the parties to establish a separate property regime to
avoid community property altogether.112
c. Article 2329’s Out-of-State Exemption
The final sentence of article 2329 incorporates another
exemption to the article’s general terms, noting that “[d]uring the
first year after moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state,
spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement without court
approval.”113 While considering a broad range of marital legal
issues, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted this aspect of
article 2329 in Hand v. Hand.114 Specifically, the couple in Hand
married in South Carolina, after which one of the spouses relocated
to Morgan City, Louisiana.115 A divorce followed soon
thereafter.116 Although the Hand couple did not attempt to execute
a premarital or postmarital agreement,117 the Court opined on
article 2329 and its exemption from obtaining court approval for
spouses moving into Louisiana.118 Particularly, the Court
recognized that when both spouses acquire domicile in Louisiana
within the first year after relocating to the state, the spouses do not
need to petition a court to determine whether a postmarital
agreement is in their best interests.119 Rather, the spouses may
simply execute such an agreement on their own, defining the terms
and conditions of their postmarital agreement without any help or
input from the legal system.120
Similar to the legal regime exemption explored in Muller, the
out-of-state exemption evidenced in Hand does little to further the
legislative goals behind article 2329.121 In fact, spousal
overreaching is just as likely to occur in marriages that commence
112. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
113. Id.
114. Hand v. Hand, 802 So. 2d 560, 561–62 (La. 2001).
115. Id. at 561.
116. Id.
117. The dispute in Hand involved the applicability and availability of the
regime of community property to a married couple when only one spouse was a
Louisiana domiciliary. Id. In reaching the conclusion that both spouses must be
domiciled in Louisiana to obtain community property status, the court
interpreted the use of the terms “spouse” and “spouses” in the various
matrimonial regime Civil Code articles. Id. at 562–63. In fact, the court
determined that article 2329, along with a few others, requires both parties to be
domiciled in the state before the provisions of the law apply. Id. at 566.
118. Id. at 562.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91–92.
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in other states as it is in those that begin in Louisiana.122 It is difficult
to imagine why spousal overreaching would be a phenomenon
experienced only in Louisiana, yet this exemption seems to recognize
such a notion by relaxing the marital contracting standards for
marriages instituted elsewhere.
II. A CALL FOR CHANGE: THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REVISING
ARTICLE 2329
The marital institution is largely in need of an overhaul.
Prospective spouses are abstaining from marriage like never
before, generating significant consequences for themselves and
society as a whole.123 In an attempt to right the floundering ship of
marriage, affirmative action should be taken to restore and
modernize the marital institution in accordance with our evolving
society. In Louisiana specifically, Civil Code article 2329 provides
a promising opportunity to begin updating and improving the
status and reputation of marriage within the state. The principles
and theories embodied in article 2329 are problematic as applied to
today’s society, injecting unnecessary inconvenience and
inconsistency into the marital agreement arena. The premarital and
postmarital distinctions within the article make little sense today,
and the potential for abuse of the court-approval requirement is
high.124 As a whole, Louisiana spouses should have the freedom
and flexibility to structure their marriages on their own terms,
which is not entirely possible under the current version of article
2329. Thus, article 2329 should be revised with an eye on the
future, adapting its outdated provisions to the needs of a changing
world.
A. The Changing Perception of Marriage: A Motivation for
Revision
In the State of Louisiana, as well as in several other states
around the country, flexibility is needed and warranted in the realm

122. See id. at 92.
123. See generally Hallett, supra note 6; see, e.g., Ron Haskins, Marriage on the
Rocks: Economic and Social Consequences for Kids, BROOKINGS (June 26,
2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/06/26-marriage-economicsocial-consequences-haskins, archived at http://perma.cc/M4QN-B25M (discussing
the effects of the changing role of marriage on children).
124. See infra Part II.C.
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of marital contracting.125 In the words of one scholar, “the law of
marital agreements should be compatible with evolving
understandings of the meaning of marriage, including the rise of
individualized marriage.”126 Currently, Louisiana Civil Code article
2329 embodies legislative goals that are a product of outdated
reasoning and antiquated perceptions of reality, illustrating the
incompatibility of article 2329 with modern marital principles.127
With the state of marriage in the United States currently in flux,
outdated laws such as article 2329 serve as inviting opportunities to
begin correcting the flaws and misconceptions soiling the institution
of marriage and its reputation.
As such, the rules and distinctions of article 2329 serve as
unwarranted obstacles to a positive marriage rate for at least two
reasons. First, standards that govern marital agreements and hinder
a couple’s ability to alter the default rules undoubtedly work
against the current trend of private ordering and individualized
marriage structuring.128 Additionally, marriage standards that are
“heavily laden with mandatory terms may not attract adherents.”129
For these reasons, as well as several others,130 the Legislature
should revise article 2329 to better conform to the modern needs
and understandings of marriage. Given the decreasing marriage
rate across the nation, the uniformity and flexibility of marital
contracting laws would serve society well as a step in the right
direction toward encouraging and fostering the institution of
marriage. Scholars have long debated the appropriateness of
distinguishing between premarital and postmarital agreements, and
the inherent distinctions embodied in article 2329 do little to
125. Louisiana is one of several states that imposes heightened restrictions on
postmarital agreements while premarital agreements remain largely unregulated.
See Williams, supra note 15, at 881; see also discussion supra Part I.
126. Atwood, supra note 10, at 16.
127. Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 was enacted to protect weaker
spouses from their more dominant counterparts within the marital relationship, a
goal that is no longer necessary due to the changing landscape of marital life.
See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91–92; see discussion supra Part I.
128. Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317. The complexities of modern society and
the growing financial and economic intricacies of relationships have led to an
increase in the use of privately structured marriages. See discussion supra Part
I.A. In other words, marital agreements are more prevalent than ever, and the
outdated requirements of article 2329 are an unnecessary obstacle for couples
opting to marry on their own terms. See discussion supra Part I.A.
129. Atwood, supra note 10, at 16.
130. In addition to the declining marriage rate and the need for flexibility in
the marital institution, article 2329 proves ineffective and inefficient in itself.
See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 92. Article 2329 is highly inconsistent in
attempting to accomplish its policy objectives, and its requirements are better
suited for a time long ago. See id. at 91–92.
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promote the legislative goals cited in support of the law.131
Therefore, given the unpopularity of marriage in today’s society,
along with the inconsistencies and outdated requirements of article
2329, the marital agreement law in Louisiana is ripe for change.
B. The Shifting Socioeconomic Times: Court Approval Is Outdated
and Unnecessary
Similarly, the policies supporting article 2329’s heightened,
restrictive governance of postmarital agreements are also outdated.
The policy justifications behind article 2329’s enactment are
grounded in the notion that marriages inherently involve disparate
bargaining power and require oversight to guard against spousal
overreaching.132 However, although the marriages of yesteryear
may have involved spouses with unequal bargaining power and
diverse educational and societal backgrounds,133 today’s marriage
statistics suggest that such disparity is no longer prevalent.134
Individuals who enter into marital contracts today are much
more sophisticated and educated, and women consistently find
themselves less disadvantaged as compared to their male
counterparts.135 This theme of marital equality also holds true in
Louisiana, where women are becoming more involved in the
workforce and are contributing substantially to the financial
stability of their households.136 In addition to boosting the marital
equality between spouses, these trends suggest that marital
contracts may actually provide women with more “leverage” in the
marital context, a proposition that is entirely different from the
inferior marital standing that was once ascribed to women.137
Accordingly, “a new era of marriage has arrived—an individual’s
autonomy and right to contract supersede the theory that marriage is
a partnership wherein contracting would require greater
131. See id. at 92.
132. See discussion supra Part I.A.
133. Hawke, supra note 12.
134. See id.; see also Carter, supra note 12.
135. Bix et al., supra note 5, at 316.
136. Steven Ward, Divorce Rate in La. Above Nation’s, THE ADVOCATE
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://theadvocate.com/home/771554-79/divorce-rate-in-la.above, archived at http://perma.cc/N89B-659J.
137. Bix et al., supra note 5, at 316. As such, women are no longer reliant
upon the protection of favorable marital agreements. See generally id. Rather,
the naturally heightened bargaining power that women, as a whole, possess
today provides adequate protection. See generally id. Therefore, the increased
protection guaranteed by article 2329’s court-approval requirement is no longer
necessary.
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accountability.”138 Therefore, the Legislature’s goal of protecting
the less-worldly spouse has essentially been accomplished by the
natural evolution of society, a process through which the lessworldly spouse has become virtually nonexistent.139 Thus, article
2329’s postmarital contracting requirements mandating court
approval are currently unnecessary.
Adding to the general ineffectiveness of article 2329’s courtapproval requirement, article 2329 plainly delegates the
determination of whether a postmarital agreement serves a married
couple’s best interests to an impartial, disinterested judge.140 In
making the best-interest determination, the judge is, ideally,
supposed to consider whether the spouses “understand the
principles and rules governing the matrimonial regime and whether
such a regime serves their best interests.”141 However, faced with
the personal, unique circumstances of each married couple, a judge
is largely unable to pronounce whether that couple understands the
agreement or whether it fits the couple’s aspirations and
lifestyle.142 In order to make such a determination, a judge can do
nothing “short of administering an exam to them on the subject.”143
Overall, a disinterested judge is generally unable to determine
the true best interests of a married couple in an effective manner.144
Although judges presumably operated as helpful mediators
guarding against spousal abuse in the past, these judicial services
are no longer a necessary component of marital contracting.
Today, statistics indicate that married individuals are more than
able to stand up for themselves within the confines of marriage,
having achieved near-equal levels of education and marital
equality.145 As such, today’s married couples should have the
freedom to structure their marital agreements as they wish.
138. Stephanie A. Bruno, Note, Insuring the Knot: The Massachusetts
Approach to Postnuptial Agreements, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 397, 421 (2012).
139. Although one spouse may have more financial stability than the other,
statistics suggest that spouses are generally on an equal playing field today in
terms of bargaining power and marital control. See Williams, supra note 15, at
851.
140. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
141. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 94.
142. The nature of the best-interest determination is undoubtedly an involved
process, substantially hindering the decision-making abilities of judges and
making an accurate determination that much more difficult to render. See
generally id. at 94–95.
143. Id. at 94.
144. See id. To make an effective determination, a judge must employ
considerable resources and truly understand the spouses’ predicaments and
lifestyles, a feat that is no easy task. See generally id.
145. Hawke, supra note 12. See also Carter, supra note 12.
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Although article 2329 is outdated and unnecessary as applied
to the spouses involved in a marital agreement, some may argue
that article 2329 is still needed to protect the spouses’ creditors.146
However, such an argument is largely unwarranted. The original
proposal of article 2329 offered by the Law Institute in 1979
“made clear that the concern in allowing spouses to enter into
matrimonial agreements was solely for the welfare of the spouse
whose contributions to the marriage were largely non-economic,
and not for the interest of creditors or forced heirs”:147
Since the judicial inquiry must focus on the best interests of
the spouses, they should not have to prove that no harm
will accrue to their creditors as a result of the proposed
agreement. Creditors, like forced heirs, are protected in
other areas of the law. Available to the creditors are the
same remedies they have against any contract of the debtor,
in particular, the revocatory action, the action in declaration
of simulation, and the oblique action.148
Therefore, a revision of article 2329 would not significantly
affect the position or status of creditors, as they have a sufficient
number of alternative remedies at their disposal to protect
themselves under the law.149 Not only are article 2329’s arbitrary
requirements unnecessary as applied to the spouses and
prospective spouses opting to contract marital agreements in
Louisiana, the article’s protections are also immaterial from the
perspective of creditors, and the article should be revised to reflect
this new economic reality of marriage.
C. Problems of Inconsistency: Article 2329’s Exemptions Make
Little Sense
In addition to its outdated reasoning and antiquated policy
rationales, article 2329 is also a highly inconsistent piece of
legislation. Despite the Legislature’s desire to prevent spousal
overreaching by requiring spouses to obtain judicial approval when
contracting postmaritally, the language of article 2329 incorporates
several exemptions from its otherwise strict court-approval
146. See, e.g., Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91.
147. Id. The quoted language demonstrates that the security of creditors was
not a primary motive in allowing spouses to engage in marital contracts. Thus,
this suggests that abolishing the distinction codified in article 2329 would not be
unfair to creditors. See id.
148. Id. at 98 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 91, 98.
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requirement.150 Specifically, the following individuals are
exempted from obtaining court approval: prospective spouses;
spouses who marry out of state and enter into a marital agreement
within one year of moving to Louisiana; spouses who married and
established the legal regime prior to January 1, 1980; and spouses
who change to the legal regime by marital agreement.151
However, the legislative goal for which article 2329 was
created, protection of the less-worldly spouse, is hardly served or
advanced by these exemptions. The justification for the enhanced
scrutiny of postmarital agreements is the protection of the lessworldly spouse, but less-worldly spouses and potential spouses
also engage in the agreements encompassed by the exemptions
without procedural protections.152 Criticizing the inconsistencies of
article 2329, Professor Katherine Spaht explained why its
exemptions make little sense:
In the situations encompassed by the exemptions,
overreaching by one of the parties is as great a possibility
as in those situations not exempted. The less-worldly party
is not necessarily any better able to defend himself or
herself from a disastrous matrimonial agreement before
getting married than after the ceremony, before having
lived in Louisiana one year than after this period of
residency, or before January 1, 1980 than after that date.
Likewise, a change to the legal regime, which does not
require court approval, may not always be in the interest of
the less-worldly spouse, as when an antenuptial agreement,
carefully planned with the aid of the parents to protect the
less-worldly spouse, is upset by a change to the legal
regime.153
Thus, one is hard pressed to find a “coherent rationale” for the
court-approval requirement of article 2329 due to its various
exemptions.154 The exemptions effectively weaken the policy
objectives of article 2329, doing little to prevent spousal overreaching
and failing to fully protect the less-worldly spouse.155 Article 2329 is
inherently “inconsistent in its attitude toward spousal overreaching,”
150. Id. See supra Part I.B.2; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). The legal regime in Louisiana is one of
community property. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2327 (2015).
152. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 92. Marital agreements have
traditionally been subjected to heightened regulations to equalize the contractual
aptitudes of spouses in marital relationships. Id.
153. Id.
154. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 110.
155. Id.
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which is not surprising given the haste with which the requirement
was added into the article during the 1979 legislative session.156
Furthermore, the plain language of article 2329 does not
require a married couple to seek a full-fledged judicial hearing in
order to obtain court approval of a postmarital agreement,
evidencing another inefficiency in article 2329’s application.157 In
fact, the couple does not even need to personally appear before the
judge.158 Conceivably, if the Legislature intended to protect weaker
spouses and prevent spousal overreaching, a mandatory hearing
would have been an appropriate procedural protection to
implement. Without such a hearing, the more powerful spouse is in
a position to execute a forged agreement or impose his will on the
other spouse to sign an unfavorable affidavit, ultimately negating
the stated goals of article 2329.
Although spousal overreaching is not a significant concern in
today’s society, the judiciary has nevertheless dropped the
figurative ball in interpreting article 2329 by not requiring spouses
to appear before the court. As such, spouses have the opportunity
to “overreach” article 2329’s protections aimed at preventing that
very activity. Today, the potential for spousal overreaching is not
as amplified as it was in the past, yet the lack of a mandatory
hearing in article 2329 calls the reasoning of the Legislature into
question and reveals yet another problem with article 2329’s
procedural protections.
In addition, spouses are able to circumvent the court-approval
requirements of article 2329 with some creative contracting
techniques. “Spouses who believe that the requirement of judicial
approval of all postnuptial matrimonial agreements is an
undesirable intrusion into their private affairs may attempt to
minimize judicial involvement by initially contracting a regime
containing a mechanism to change it.”159 For example, spouses
could “include in their original agreement a ‘termination’ provision
and an alternate regime to be adopted upon the lapse of the original
regime.”160 Legally justified as either a conditional obligation or an
156. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91 (“Since the requirement of court
approval went in and out of the bill as if caught in a revolving door, it is not
surprising that the new legislation is inconsistent in its attitude toward spousal
overreaching.”).
157. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). See also Boyer v. Boyer, 616 So. 2d
730, 734 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). See also Hargrave, supra note 74, at
741; Boyer, 616 So. 2d at 731.
159. Laura Schofield Bailey, Note, Marital Property Agreements—Being
Creative With The New Legislation, 43 LA. L. REV. 159, 164 (1982).
160. Id.
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optional, alternative regime,161 these contractual mechanisms and
spouses’ use of these mechanisms are ultimately subverting the
goals and requirements of article 2329. Therefore, the holes in
article 2329’s proverbial net extend far and wide, providing several
opportunities for willing and eager spouses to avoid the legislative
protections embodied within the article. The current version of
article 2329 is largely unnecessary in today’s society, a conclusion
that is furthered by the ineffectiveness of the article and fueled by
the potentials for abuse detailed above.
The majority of article 2329’s intricacies may even overshadow
the legislature’s admirable goals, creating more inconvenience than
value. Article 2329 essentially relegates postmarital agreements to
the discretionary regulation of a court, requiring individuals
contracting postmaritally to comply with a strict court-approval
requirement in order to do so.162 On the other hand, premarital
agreements and those agreements encompassed by article 2329’s
exemptions are not governed by similarly strict requirements.163 In
essence, article 2329 makes agreements that are established or
altered during marriage more onerous than their premarital
counterparts, a result that is inconsistent with sound policy given
the modern landscape of marriage.164 These discrepancies suggest
that article 2329 is largely a disappointment as applied to modern
day society. Although admittedly some safeguards may be
necessary, article 2329 goes too far by imposing arbitrary
distinctions and restrictions on postmarital agreements.
D. The Obligatory Nature of Article 2329 Is Questionable
The argument for revising article 2329 is enhanced by the
possibility that the Louisiana Legislature may not have intended
article 2329’s marital contracting requirements to be mandatory.165
In fact, article 2329 is potentially a suppletive requirement that
may be “derogated from conventionally.”166 “Neither the text nor
161. Id.
162. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
163. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91.
164. By imposing additional requirements and hurdles on individuals
attempting to contract during marriage, the institution is hardly furthered or
promoted. Atwood, supra note 10, at 16. Recognizing that marriage is a favorable
public policy objective, difficulty in marital contracting is not desirable nor does it
encourage individuals to enter into the institution. Daniel T. Lichter, Marriage as
Public Policy, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2001), http://www.human.cornell
.edu/pam/outreach/upload/marriage_lichter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/52SHY8LG.
165. Bailey, supra note 159, at 162.
166. Id. at 166.
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the comments to the 1979 revision impose any sanctions for the
failure to obtain judicial approval,” suggesting that Louisiana
couples may not need to abide by the dictates of article 2329:167
Article 2329 arguably falls under the general category of
supplemental law since it contains neither a commentative nor
textual directive of absolute nullity when the parties fail to
obtain judicial approval. Another factor supporting the
supplemental character of this requirement is the general trend
of increasing spousal contractual freedom. The legislature
dropped the historical bars to interspousal contracting168 on the
assumption that modern spouses have equal bargaining
strength and can rely on general contractual enforcement and
protective devices to prevent overreaching. Requiring
mandatory judicial approval is inconsistent with this
assumption; article 2329 should not be considered mandatory
absent an express directive.169
At the very least, the obligatory nature of article 2329 is
questionable.170 Although Louisiana courts generally nullify
postmarital agreements that do not fulfill the court-approval
requirement,171 such action is not traceable to a legislative directive.
Thus, despite courts nullifying agreements that do not comply with
article 2329, one is left to wonder whether such nullification is truly
what the Legislature intended when it enacted the court approval
provisions of article 2329. Therefore, a revision of the article would
help clarify its intended application, as the confusion surrounding
the obligatory nature of article 2329 supports the idea that it should
be revised to resolve the issue.
E. Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Theory
On a broader note, Louisiana has witnessed a “general trend of
increasing spousal contractual freedom” over the last few
decades.172 In fact, this trend is not unique to Louisiana, as many
community property states have witnessed similar movements
167. Id. at 167.
168. Recognizing that the Legislature “dropped the historical bars to
interspousal contracting,” Bailey is referring to the fact that the Legislature
eliminated interspousal contractual incapacity when it implemented Louisiana
Civil Code article 1790 during the 1978 legislative session. Id.
169. Id. at 167–68 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 168.
171. See, e.g., Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d 364, 368 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
172. Bailey, supra note 159, at 167.
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toward contractual freedom among spouses.173 Recognizing such
freedom as “advantageous,” one legal commentator offered the
following insight into the significance of postmarital contracting in
Louisiana:
Allowing modification of the regime during marriage can be
advantageous for a number of reasons—to utilize as an estate
planning tool, to replace what has become an unfavorable
system, to reflect changes resulting from the birth and growth
of children, to reflect changes in wealth, etc.174
It appears that Louisiana generally favors contractual freedom
in the realm of marital contracting.175 However, article 2329 does
not accord with this general view. Rather, article 2329 continues to
embody strict postmarital contracting requirements, a testament to
its outdated legislative reasoning and nonconformity with modern
trends.
Freedom-of-contract theory also provides a helpful response to
some supporters of article 2329’s court-approval requirement. For
example, advocates of article 2329 often rely on the presence of a
similar prerequisite in an old French Code Civil article as
justification for retaining the requirement in Louisiana.176 In fact,
French Code Civil article 1397 also requires spouses to obtain
court approval in order to change or implement a marital
agreement during marriage.177 However, the incorporation of the
court-approval requirement into the law of Louisiana is not as
seamless as its advocates believe. A prominent Louisiana scholar
noted that “the French legal system may be better suited for this
kind of judicial inquiry than Louisiana’s.”178 European countries,
such as France, are historically “less deferential to freedom of
contract” principles than are American jurisdictions,179 lending
support to the notion that article 2329’s court-approval requirement
is misplaced. In the United States, where freedom of contract is a
popular concept,180 the court-approval requirement seems rather
173. Id. at 163.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 167.
176. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 94−95 n.82.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE §§ 3.11–3.21,
7.51(c) (1967)).
179. Atwood, supra note 10, at 34.
180. See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12.3 (4th ed.) (“[P]ublic policy . . .
requires that parties of full age and competent understanding must have the
greatest freedom of contracting, and contracts, when entered into freely and
voluntarily, must be upheld and enforced by the courts.”).
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contradictory. Therefore, requiring court approval before
implementing or changing a marital agreement seems to make much
more sense in the French legal environment than it does in
Louisiana.
On a different note, a likely counterargument to freedom-ofcontract theory in the marital context lies in the inherently unstable
nature of the marital institution.181 Specifically, this counterargument
is founded upon the notion “that the bargaining dynamics within an
intact marriage are materially different than the dynamics of
premarital bargaining.”182 However, marital instability has been
exaggerated in this regard, leading many to the unwarranted
conclusion that spouses are unable to bargain on an equal playing
field.183 In fact, “[b]argaining theory suggests that courts and
commentators have overstated the likely disparity in bargaining
power between richer and poorer spouses.”184 Moreover, even
single-income families, in which the wife serves as a homemaker
while the husband functions as the primary breadwinner, do not
present concerns of contractual instability.185
Although unbridled marital contracting will not always produce
fair outcomes, “any injustice is likely to be the result of the spouses’
default entitlements and not any defect in the bargaining process
itself.”186 Rather than flowing from disproportionate bargaining
power, injustices in postmarital contracting will occur to the extent
that the default marital contracting rules of the state are unjust.187
Therefore, if the state has established an effective set of default rules
to govern marital relationships and the separation of property upon
the dissolution of those relationships, spouses will not find
themselves contracting with one another on an unequal playing
field. Any injustices that are prevented solely by imposing
amplified restrictions on postmarital contracting are minimal.188
As a leading family law scholar recognized, the availability of
postmarital agreements leaves both spouses better off than they
would be without such an option.189 Bluffing and trickery generally
181. See generally Williams, supra note 15, at 830 (explaining that some
scholars continue to believe that bargaining dynamics in the marital realm are
materially different from bargaining in other contexts).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 851.
184. Id.
185. “[E]ven in a traditional family where the husband works for wages and
the wife works in the home, the husband’s bargaining power will not be
significantly greater than his wife’s.” Id.
186. Id. at 879.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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do not influence the marital contracting process, as women likely
have sufficient information to recognize any inopportune agreements
presented to them by their husbands.190 Overall, “[t]he results of any
bargain will benefit both spouses compared to their option to divorce
under the state’s default rules.”191
F. Privacy Concerns: Marital Agreements Are Intended To Be
Private
Furthermore, some scholars seem to respect the increasing
marital equality and contractual capabilities of spouses by
recognizing those spouses’ privacy to execute their agreements.192
In fact, all postmarital agreements are intended to be private and
solely a matter for consideration between the spouses.193 Moreover,
“[n]o state requires that spouses register their [postmarital]
agreements in any formal way.”194 Nevertheless, Louisiana seems to
reject this notion of privacy altogether, forcing spouses to seek the
input and approval of an outside official before implementing a
postmarital agreement.195 Although marital agreements must be
recorded in the public records in certain circumstances,196 such
recordation of the agreement does not rise to the level of injecting an
outsider’s input into the substance of the agreement.197
If marital agreements are truly intended to be private, injecting
the disinterested opinions of a third-party judge into the postmarital
contracting process does little to further privacy-oriented objectives.
As a whole, postmarital agreements are intended to be a private
matter for a reason. Particularly in today’s society in which the
marital playing field has largely been equalized, spouses know how
they want to structure their marriages, and they are educated and
worthy enough to make those decisions in private by themselves.

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See generally id. at 833.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015).
196. In Louisiana, a marital agreement must be recorded in the public records
in order to affect third persons. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2332 (2015).
197. Arguably, the recordation of a marital agreement is much less of an
intrusion into privacy than allowing a third party to dictate substantive terms of
that agreement.
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III. A SURVEY OF DIFFERING JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES
With premarital and postmarital agreements finding widespread
acceptance and utilization throughout the United States,198 it should
not come as a surprise that many states and regulatory bodies differ
in their approaches as to how such agreements should be regulated.
For example, the Uniform Law Commission recently approved the
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, model legislation
that serves as a prime example for states to follow in updating their
laws governing marital agreements.199 To date, Colorado and North
Dakota have adopted the Act in their jurisdictions, while legislators
in Mississippi and the District of Columbia have introduced the
Act to their colleagues for approval.200
Another popular regulatory approach involves a careful-scrutiny
framework in which a judge is to consider a marital agreement with
“careful scrutiny” only if the agreement is challenged or
contested.201 Massachusetts employs such a framework in an
effective manner.202
Yet another approach focuses on the notion that spouses must
employ independent counsel when formulating their agreements,
an approach grounded in principles of substantive fairness, which
has been adopted by the state of Minnesota.203
Lastly, other states opt to treat premarital and postmarital
agreements under an identical set of standards, citing a general
freedom-of-contract theory as justification for doing so.204 Utah
and Wisconsin govern marital agreements in this manner, yet both
operate slightly differently in regulating premarital and postmarital
agreements on a level playing field.
A. Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act
On a national stage, the law governing marital agreements has
undergone significant modifications in accordance with the everchanging world of marriage. The Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) recently approved the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act, a new piece of model legislation calling for states
198. Stoner, supra note 28.
199. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (2012).
200. Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Premarital+and+Marital+Agreements
+Act, archived at http://perma.cc/NA2F-6Y3N (last visited Feb. 5, 2015).
201. See infra Part III.B.
202. See infra Part III.B.
203. See infra Part III.C.
204. See infra Part III.D.
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“to treat premarital agreements and marital agreements under the
same set of principles and requirements.”205 Approved in July
2012, the Act suggests that “parties should be free, within broad
limits, to choose the financial terms of their marriage,” with due
process and substantive fairness benchmarks serving as the only
limitations.206
As its name suggests, the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act covers agreements executed both prior and
subsequent to the beginning of a marital relationship.207 After
considerable debate, the Drafting Committee of the Act determined
that premarital and postmarital agreements should be judged under
the same set of standards, arguing that postmarital agreements do
not deserve the heightened scrutiny that many states currently
employ.208 The Drafting Committee recognized that postmarital
agreements are characterized by a different set of risks than are
premarital agreements, namely risks of unfairness, duress and
undue influence, and changing circumstances.209 In response, the
Drafting Committee concluded that the resources available in the
new Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, along with
various common law principles, are “sufficient to deal with the
likely problems related to either type of transaction.”210
The requirement that the spouse presented with a proposed
agreement have access to independent legal representation before
executing the agreement is arguably the most important feature of
the new Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act.211 Such
access “necessarily means both the money to hire a lawyer and the
time to find one, get advice, and consider that advice.”212 This
requirement of separate legal representation applies to both
premarital and postmarital agreements, ensuring that spouses in
both circumstances have enough time and resources to fully
consider any proposed changes to the terms of their marital
relationships.213 At the end of the day, requiring access to

205. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (2012).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Bix et al., supra note 5, at 315.
209. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (2012).
210. Id.
211. Linda J. Ravdin, The New Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement
Act, PASTERNAK & FIDIS (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.pasternakfidis.com/divorce
_family_law/new-uniform-premarital-marital-agreements-act, archived at http:
//perma.cc/3N8D-8Y7S.
212. Id.
213. See id.
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independent legal counsel will cut down on spousal overreaching
and unfairness in marital contracting.214
The objective of the Drafting Committee in the Uniform
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act was to produce an act that
“promote[d] informed decision-making and procedural fairness
without undermining interests in contractual autonomy, predictability,
and reliance.”215 Importantly, the Drafting Committee was motivated
by the “changing socioeconomic reality” taking place in the United
States, citing the notion that men and women are no longer inherently
unequal creatures in marital relationships:216
The Committee was also aware of our changing
socioeconomic reality. Notwithstanding the persistence of
economic inequality along gender lines, the relative value
of marriage for men and women has been shifting since the
original UPAA was enacted. Women have exceeded men in
education and income growth over the last four decades
and have almost reached parity as a percentage of the
workforce. In almost a quarter of marriages, wives are now
the higher wage earners, and in a majority of marriages,
wives have an equal or higher education level than their
husbands.217
Providing a national perspective on the inconsistencies in
marital contracting that are prevalent in Louisiana, the Uniform
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act serves as a welcoming
opportunity to revise article 2329 to conform to today’s society.
The Council of State Governments approved the Act as “Suggested
State Legislation” in September 2013, further demonstrating that
the Act is ripe for adoption across the country.218

214. One should recognize, however, that requiring access to independent
counsel will create barriers to freedom of contract. Nevertheless, such a
requirement may be necessary to govern the marital relationship effectively
without mandating that spouses obtain court approval of their marital
agreements. Essentially, one may be faced with a battle of two evils in the
marital context due to the inherent instability that remains a part of the
institution. See supra Part II.
215. Bix et al., supra note 5, at 315.
216. Id. at 316.
217. Id. (citations omitted).
218. CSG Includes Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act as
“Suggested State Legislation”, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=CSG%20Includes%20Uniform
%20Premarital%20and%20Marital%20Agreements%20Act%20as%20%22Suggest
ed%20State%20Legislation%22, archived at http://perma.cc/S2K5-6A9F.
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B. Modified Careful-Scrutiny Framework
Massachusetts employs a careful-scrutiny test that effectively
addresses and adapts to the concerns surrounding marital
agreements in an appropriate, efficient, and modern framework.219
First, postmarital agreements are not subject to a court-approval
requirement in Massachusetts as they are in Louisiana.220 Rather,
Massachusetts respects the wishes of contracting spouses and
allows them to contract postmarital agreements without imposing
any restrictions at the time of agreement.221 The only restrictions
on postmarital agreements in Massachusetts are imposed much
later in the process, if and when the agreement is challenged or
contested in court.222 “In general, Massachusetts courts prefer to
respect the right of [the] parties to freely enter into contracts.
Postnuptial agreements are, however, subject to careful
scrutiny.”223
If presented with a disputed marital agreement, Massachusetts
courts require that agreement to be “fair and reasonable both at the
time of its execution and the time of its enforcement.”224 Although
these principles are not legislatively codified, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court has set forth a five-factor test with which to
determine the enforceability of marital agreements:225
Before a marital agreement is sanctioned by a court, careful
scrutiny by the judge should determine at a minimum
whether (1) each party has had an opportunity to obtain
separate legal counsel of each party’s own choosing; (2)
there was fraud or coercion in obtaining the agreement; (3)
all assets were fully disclosed by both parties before the
agreement was executed; (4) each spouse knowingly and
explicitly agreed in writing to waive the right to a judicial
equitable division of assets and all marital rights in the
event of a divorce; and (5) the terms of the agreement are
fair and reasonable at the time of execution and at the time
of divorce. Where one spouse challenges the enforceability
219. See generally Bruno, supra note 138; Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929
N.E.2d 955 (Mass. 2010).
220. See Bruno, supra note 138.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Mary H. Schmidt & Christopher H. Suh, A Practical Guide to Estate
Planning in Massachusetts, MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC., EPII MACLE 12-1 (Vol. II, ch. 12) (2011) (citing DeCristofaro v. DeCristofaro, 508
N.E.2d 104 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); Ansin, 929 N.E.2d at 963–64 (Mass. 2010)).
224. See Schmidt & Suh, supra note 223.
225. See Ansin, 929 N.E.2d at 963–64.
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of the agreement, the spouse seeking to enforce the
agreement shall bear the burden of satisfying these
criteria.226
Massachusetts does not impose heightened restrictions on
postmarital agreements from the outset.227 Rather, all marital
agreements in Massachusetts are simply viewed with “careful
scrutiny” if challenged to guard against any possible mistreatment or
unfair dealing.228 Therefore, Massachusetts couples are not burdened
with having to obtain court approval of their postmarital agreements,
as they are able to effectively structure the terms of their marriages
themselves.
C. Substantive Fairness and Independent Counsel Framework
Similar to Louisiana, Minnesota imposes restrictions on
postmarital agreements that do not apply to premarital agreements.229
Specifically, Minnesota “requires that each spouse be represented by
counsel when forming a postnuptial agreement, but requires merely
the opportunity to obtain independent counsel when forming a
prenuptial agreement.”230 In the realm of postmarital agreements,
Minnesota also “require[s] that the agreement meet standards of
substantive fairness both at the time it is signed and at the time it is
ultimately enforced, even though [Minnesota] reject[s] this
requirement for prenuptial agreements.”231
Overall, postmarital agreements in Minnesota are not effective
unless the spouses are represented by independent counsel and the
agreement is substantively fair at the time it is signed and the time
it is enforced.232 However, Minnesota does not require spouses to
seek judicial approval of their postmarital agreements, but instead
leaves it up to the spouses to decide what the terms of their
marriage should be.233 Thus, Minnesota’s landscape of postmarital
and premarital agreements is characterized by heightened
restrictions on the former, but unlike Louisiana, it does not require
an outside determination by a disinterested third party.

226. Id. (footnotes omitted).
227. See Schmidt & Suh, supra note 223.
228. See id.; Ansin, 929 N.E.2d at 963–64.
229. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 (West 2015).
230. Williams, supra note 15, at 838–39. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. §
519.11 (West 2015).
231. Williams, supra note 15, at 839.
232. Id. at 838–39. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 (West 2013).
233. Williams, supra note 15, at 838–39.
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D. General Freedom-of-Contract Framework
In Utah, premarital and postmarital agreements are treated
under a common set of standards, and postmarital agreements are
not subject to any heightened restrictions or requirements.234 In
fact, a postmarital agreement in Utah is enforceable “absent fraud,
coercion, or material nondisclosure.”235 According to prominent
Utah family law attorney Eric Johnson, “[p]ostmarital and
premarital agreements are generally subject to ordinary contract
principles.”236 Essentially, postmarital agreements and premarital
agreements are in no way different from any other type of contract
in Utah. Overall, the state seems to completely ignore the marital
aspect of spousal contracting, bypassing the fact that the
bargaining parties may potentially be at less than arm’s length.
In Wisconsin, premarital and postmarital agreements are
treated identically by statute.237 Specifically, Wisconsin previously
adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act, a 1986 Uniform
Law Commission proposal that the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act is designed to replace, for both premarital and
postmarital agreements.238 Therefore, in Wisconsin, premarital and
postmarital agreements are generally enforceable, unless a spouse
proves satisfaction of one of a host of factors delineated by the
Wisconsin legislature.239 Unlike Louisiana, Wisconsin does not
require spouses to obtain court approval if they attempt to execute
a postmarital agreement, nor does Wisconsin subject such
agreements to heighted restrictions.
IV. HOW LOUISIANA SHOULD ADDRESS THE DEFICIENCIES OF
ARTICLE 2329: ALTERNATIVES TO PURSUE IN REVISION
The Louisiana Legislature could pursue a few different avenues
in revising article 2329, all of which have the potential to be
effective in updating Louisiana’s marital agreement laws and
philosophies. Two of the more promising solutions are incorporated
in the following subsections. One such approach embraces the
forethought and reasoning of the Uniform Law Commission, as
Louisiana could adopt the Uniform Premarital and Marital
234. See Eric K. Johnson, Utah Family Law, in 2 UTAH PRACTICE SERIES § 308-6 (2014 ed.).
235. D’Aston v. D’Aston, 808 P.2d 111, 113 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
236. Johnson, supra note 234.
237. WIS. STAT. ANN § 766.58 (West 2015).
238. Id.
239. Id. See generally Katherine W. Lambert, Death in Wisconsin, in 16
WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES § 12:15 (9th ed. West 2014).
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Agreements Act to reform the current version of article 2329.240
This approach would help to align Louisiana with the national
trends, which have begun to shift toward the equal treatment of
premarital and postmarital agreements.241 As such, Louisiana
spouses and prospective spouses would realize and experience the
freedom and flexibility that is needed to equate marital contracting
laws with the current landscape of the marital institution, making it
that much easier to enter into and modify marital relationships.
Alternatively, Louisiana could employ a careful-scrutiny framework
very similar to the one currently utilized by Massachusetts.242 This
approach would help Louisiana adapt to the changing landscape of
marriage by providing spouses with more freedom to execute
marital agreements on their own terms while retaining an aspect of
judicial oversight to prevent abuse if the agreements are ever
challenged or contested.243
A. Louisiana Should Adopt the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act
First, a promising solution that the Louisiana Legislature should
pursue in correcting the inefficiencies and shortcomings of article
2329 is to adopt the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act
in Louisiana. The Act treats premarital and postmarital agreements
under the same set of standards, dealing with any risks inherent in
postmarital agreements in a more flexible and appropriate
manner.244 By requiring spouses to obtain independent counsel and
implementing other procedural mechanisms such as due process
requirements in the formation of marital agreements as well as
principles of substantive fairness,245 the Uniform Premarital and
Marital Agreements Act effectively governs postmarital agreements
without imposing unreasonable restrictions or undue distinctions.
240. See infra Part IV.A.
241. See infra Part IV.A.
242. See infra Part IV.B.
243. See infra Part IV.B.
244. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (2012).
245. The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act requires that
spouses have independent legal representation when executing premarital and
postmarital agreements. Id. In addition, the Act delineates several enforcement
standards, noting that agreements may be deemed unenforceable under
circumstances involving duress, inadequate representation, and an insufficient
explanation of the rights and obligations being altered. Id. Furthermore, the Act
requires that consideration be given “to the need to promote uniformity of the
law,” and it also incorporates a list of unenforceable terms that will not be given
effect in premarital and marital agreements. Id.
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Under the Act, spouses in Louisiana would no longer be forced
to submit to the determinations of a judge in executing their
marital agreements, as they would have the freedom to contract on
their own terms. As such, Louisiana would begin to respect the
contractual capacity of its married citizens while maintaining
sufficient regulation through alternative procedures. By adopting
the Act, Louisiana’s law would be much more in line with the
modern conceptions of marriage and the needs of today’s spouses,
unlike the arbitrary court-approval requirement that remains in
force through Louisiana Civil Code article 2329.
B. Louisiana Should Implement a Legislative Solution Employing
the Massachusetts Framework
Another viable solution is to revise the article to incorporate
principles similar to those employed in Massachusetts.246 Although
Massachusetts does not currently distinguish between premarital
and postmarital agreements by statute, the state supreme court
recently handed down a landmark decision in the maritalagreement context that calls for the unique treatment of such
agreements.247 Specifically, the court in Ansin v. Craven-Ansin
delineated a list of factors that a court should consider before
“sanctioning” a marital agreement.248 Massachusetts does not
require postmarital agreements to be approved or ratified by a
court, nor does it mandate the involvement of a disinterested third
party.249 Rather, the parties are free to contract a postmarital
agreement with the terms and principles of their choosing; the
court system only becomes involved if the agreement is
subsequently challenged.250 If challenged, a Massachusetts court
will then employ the Ansin factors to ensure that the postmarital
agreement was executed and formed properly.251
This solution is also much more appropriate and in line with
the marital traditions of today than is article 2329, providing both
the flexibility and uniformity that will help attract more individuals
to the institution of marriage. The marital agreement law of
Massachusetts serves as a helpful example of marital agreement
policies being adapted to the changing marital landscape of today’s

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. 2010).
See id.
Id. at 963–64.
See id.; Bruno, supra note 138; Schmidt & Suh, supra note 223.
Schmidt & Suh, supra note 223.
Id.
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world, and Louisiana would be well served to adopt a similar
approach.
CONCLUSION
The complicated world of premarital and postmarital contracting is
characterized by historically rooted, competing views as to how much
regulation these agreements truly warrant. Although postmarital
agreements may have deserved heightened restrictions and detailed
approval requirements in the past, the day has come for a change.
Premarital and postmarital agreements are a large part of the marital
landscape in today’s society, serving as efficient mechanisms through
which couples can manage the increasingly unstable institution of
marriage. Therefore, the law governing such agreements should not
retain relics of the past—adjustment is vital. Marriage is in a
downward spiral across the country, and the Louisiana Legislature has
the ability to begin correcting this spiral in Louisiana for the better. By
offering flexibility and uniformity to married couples to structure their
marriages, more individuals are likely to favor the institution and begin
to reclaim its noted benefits. The Louisiana Legislature must revise
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 and rid the article of its arbitrary and
unwarranted court-approval requirement.
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